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I . INTRODUCTION 
ÊCONOMISTS are used to thinking that property rights are a good thing. 
Transferable property rights allow resources to be channeled to their most 
highly valued use, and they allow owners to reap the fruits of their invest-
ments . However, property rights also have costs, especially when the 
rights pertain to ideas and inventions. The aim of this paper is to explore 
the difficulties that a system of rights to ideas generates, with special 
reference to the U.S. patent system and to events in the aircraft industry. 
A patent pool among aircraft manufacturers was established in 1917, 
substantially amended in 1928, challenged by the Department of Justice in 
1972, and dismantled in a consent decree signed in 1975. It was also the 
subject of at least four major public investigations during the years 1917— 
35 . The pooling agreement made an important subset of each member's 
aircraft patents available to all other members and stemmed from a patent 
d ispute that originated in 1908 between the Wright brothers and another 
aviat ion pioneer, Glenn Curtiss. Patent rights in the agreement were roy-
al ty free, except in cases where, in the opinion of a board of arbitration, 
t h e patent involved a significant advance. Royalty payments were deter-
mined by the board. 
The government's charge in 1972 was that the agreement reduced com-
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Hoover Conference on Antitrust and 
E c o n o m i c Efficiency, August 30, 1984, under the title "Sherman Act Prohibitions and the 
G a i n s from Cooperative Effort/' Art Denzau, Tom Gilligan, David Haddock, Ed Kitch, 
K e n Koford, Ben Yu, and especially this journal's referee have provided useful comments. 
A discussion with Yoram Barzel proved to be very fruitful, and Elizabeth Case's editorial 
a s s i s tance helped me clarify the arguments. Finally, I thank Allen Strehler for unusually 
thorough research assistance. 
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petition in airplane innovation. It seems unlikely that this was the only or 
even a major effect. Other economic explanations for the agreement 
emerge by considering it in light of some problems in the economics of 
property rights. These concern (a) the allocation of returns in the case of 
bilateral monopoly and in the case of joint effort; (b) the clarity with 
which limits to rights can be defined; (c) the coordination of access to a 
public good; (d) the wastes that stem from the competition for a valuable 
unallocated property right; and (e) the use of long-term contracts to pre-
vent short-term exploitation of one party by another. The first three can 
be thought of as static, the last two as dynamic issues. While a solution to 
these problems may involve suppression of the patent system, this will 
not stifle progress if other, fairly effective mechanisms exist to reward 
technical innovation. The major features of my argument have analogues 
in the problem of eminent domain, in the justification for some property 
(such as roadways) being held in common, and in rationales for long-term 
contracts and vertical integration. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PATENT 
AGREEMENTS AND PATENTS 
A brief review of the arguments for and against patent agreements is in 
order. These arguments, it should be emphasized, take the existing patent 
system as given and do not question its basic aims and methods. 
The most flagrant abuse of a patent cross-licensing or pooling agree-
ment occurs if competitors pool the patents on their common product and 
then specify price or royalty terms that replicate the effects of a price-
1 The aircraft pool apparently ran afoul of the Justice Department's "nine no-no's" of 
patent licensing. See Bruce B. Wilson, Department of Justice Luncheon Speech, Law on 
Licensing Practices: Myth or Reality? (January 21, 1975) (remarks delivered before the 
American Patent Law Association, available from the Department of Justice). The second 
no-no prohibited a patentee from requiring a licensee to assign to the patentee any after 
acquired patents—which was effectively the case in the aircraft agreement. Also see Patent 
Pools—Baker Remarks, 1973 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), para. 50, 173, at 55, 313 (remarks of 
Donald I. Baker before the Banking Law Journal's Fifth Annual Institute on Licensing Law 
Practices, May 24, 1973): "Where [a pooling arrangement] covers everything in sight, for a 
very long period of time, it looks increasingly like a sort of non-aggression pact between the 
various elements in an industry." Baker cited the aircraft agreement as an illustration of a 
patent pool that "is a sort of insurance arrangement against being out innovated by others." 
Id. at 55, 315. Interestingly, the aircraft patent cross-license was specifically singled out as a 
legal patent pool in H. A. Toulmin, Patent Pools and Cross Licenses, 22 Va. L. Rev. 119, 
144 (1935); and in Floyd L. Vaughan, The United States Patent System 62 (1956, reprinted 
1972). The "nine no-no's" of patent licensing have been repudiated since 1973. See Patent 
Licensing—Antitrust Division's View, 1984 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), para. 50, 446, at 56, 
127 (remarks of J. Paul McGrath, Patent Licensing: A Fresh Look at Antitrust Principles in a 
Changing Economic Environment, given to Seminar Services International Conference on 
U.S. Patent in Crystal City, Va., April 5, 1984). 
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fixing agreement. 2 The monopoly gains in this case are divided as they 
would be in a classic cartel. It is generally recognized, however, that the 
existence of competing patents also carries with it the possibility of patent 
litigation, with its accompanying costs. There is also the possibility that 
one or more of the patents involved will be held invalid or valid but not 
infringed. Consequently, a patent agreement may save the expense and 
uncertainty of litigation, but at the cost of effectively allowing firms to 
charge consumers for patents that should be competing in the market or 
that may be invalid in the first place. 3 
Royalty-free cross-licensing or royalty-free pooling of competing pat-
ents eliminate this disadvantage and, in the absence of any other re-
straints, is thought by some analysts to be an unambiguously harmless 
way of resolving patent disputes. 4 No money changes hands, making it 
unlikely that the agreement is a front for a cartel if there are no restric-
tions on the prices or output of the final product. By widely accepted 
standards, cross-licensing or pooling of valid complementary or noncom-
peting patents does not have an anticompetitive effect.5 
As noted, these arguments take the patent system as given and grant it a 
fundamentally benign function. But it is an open question whether the 
patent system always promotes consumer welfare or even whether it 
always promotes technical progress. After all, the Patent Act is as much a 
creature of Congress as the Clean Air Act. For example, patent grants 
may lead to the overutilization of resources in inventive activity, at least 
for certain kinds of discovery, 6 or they may retard innovation if firms do 
2 George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J. Law & Econ. 309 
(1977). Also see the discussion in Richard A. Posner and Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust: 
Cases, Economic Notes , and Other Materials 276-78 (2d ed. 1981). 
3 Ward S. Bowman, Patent and Antitrust Law, 200-201 (1973); Posner and Easterbrook, 
supra note 2, at 278; and Priest, supra note 2, at 358-59. The idea of "competing patents" is 
a contradiction in terms. For example, "perfectly competing patents" offer no patent pro-
tection. Priest, supra note 2, at 359, raises the issue of "inventions that serve the same 
function but [that] are separately patentable" without providing an answer. John S. McGee, 
Patent Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J. Law & Econ. 135, 144-48 
(1966), has a provocative analysis of the welfare effects of common control of "competing 
patents." 
4 Priest, supra note 2, at 377; and McGee, supra note 3, at 153. 
5 Bowman, supra note 3, at 200-201; and Priest, supra note 2, at 357-58. 
6 See the discussion of Arnold Plant's view of patents in Bowman, supra note 3, at 18-23; 
and Walton Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise, U.S. Senate, 76th Cong., 3d Sess . , 
Temporary Economic Committee Monograph No. 31 (1941). Advantages and disadvantages 
of the patent system are also discussed in William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploita-
tion of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 Yale L. J. 267, 270-75 (1966); and 
in Frederic M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 439-58 (2d 
ed. 1980). A relevant theoretical discussion appears in Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of 
Innovations, 50 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 348 (1968). 
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not publicize discoveries for fear of revealing information that would 
allow others to patent what the discovering firm had not originally recog-
nized as patentable material. 7 Regardless of one's views on this issue, it 
has to be granted that any actual patent system will undoubtedly embody 
sizeable imperfections judged against an ideal. United States patent law 
has had shifting standards for what constitutes a patentable invention 8 and 
has defined the scope of patents by using technical criteria rather than by 
addressing questions concerning the more speculative but also more perti-
nent economic consequences. 
It seems reasonable to conclude from these observations that there may 
be areas where patentability should be abandoned or modified, just as 
there may be areas where it has not been instituted and should be. As 
Thomas Jefferson noted: 4 T h e inherent problem was to develop some 
means of weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or 
devised but for the inducement of the pa ten t . " 9 Undoubtedly the govern-
ment's actual system falls short of the mark. If so, privately arranged 
modifications of the patent system may in some cases represent improve-
ments from the public's point of view. I will leave discussion of the 
theoretical issues for later and first present the concrete factual back-
ground from a case that seems to illustrate what desirable private im-
provements might look like. 
III. THE AIRCRAFT CROSS-LICENSING AGREEMENT 
A. The Wright-Curtiss Dispute and Its Resolution 
The aircraft manufacturers' agreement had its origins in the early days 
of flight. Orville and Wilbur Wright had solved the problem of lateral 
stability by watching buzzards fly. They mimicked the wing twisting of 
gliding birds by constructing a mechanism that warped the horizontal 
7 See Jesse W. Markham, Inventive Activity: Government Controls and the Legal Envi-
ronment, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors 
596-602 (National Bureau of Economic Research 1962) for a review of this issue. George 
Bittlingmayer, The Application of the Sherman Act to the Smog Patent Agreement, Anti-
trust Bulletin (forthcoming), has a specific example in which parties to an agreement claimed 
that the existence of patent protection stifled the exchange and dissemination of technical 
ideas. 
8 Vaughan, supra note 1, at 19-22. The latitude for shifts in interpretation is evident from 
an enumeration of the criteria for patentability: originality, novelty, utility, nonobviousness, 
and, finally, patentability of subject matter. Edmund S. Kitch and Harvey S. Perlman, Legal 
Regulation of the Competitive Process 797 (1979). 
9 Quoted in Bowman, supra note 3, at 44. 
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plane of an airplane's wings at either side in opposite directions. 1 0 They 
patented this mechanism and claimed in their patent that their rights 
extended to any system that varied the "lateral margins" in opposite 
directions. 1 1 The Wrights first flew with this system in 1903. 
At the same time, Alexander Graham Bell was conducting flying experi-
ments, providing financial support to, and enlisting the help of others 
interested in the problem of flight. Among them was a young builder and 
racer of motorcycles, Glenn Curtiss, who was part of the group because 
he knew how to make light and powerful engines. 1 2 The Bell group was 
stumped by the problem of lateral control. They knew about the Wright 
patent but apparently had reservations about the wing-warping method it 
specified. Bell suggested wing flaps, or "ailerons," which had been used 
in France. Curtiss subsequently incorporated this concept in his success-
ful flights of 1908 and applied for a patent that incorporated the concept. 
By 1915, all airplanes used wing flaps instead of the Wright method. 
Curtiss was officially granted the patent in 1916. 1 3 
The Wrights sued Curtiss for patent infringement in 1909, claiming that 
their method applied to wing flaps as well as wing twisting. After pro-
tracted litigation, Orville Wright, then the surviving Wright brother, won 
the case in 1914. 1 4 Henry Ford had recently been sued by George Selden, 
who claimed to have the patent on the automobile, and Ford put Curtiss in 
touch with Ford 's lawyer in the Selden suit, W. Benton Crisp. 1 5 Crisp got 
Curtiss to make a small change in his method of controlling the ailerons, 
which required the Wright corporation to begin litigating anew. Orville 
Wright sold out at this point, but the successor company continued to 
press its claims. With the formal entry of the United States into World 
War I imminent, however, a solution to the patent litigation was sought by 
1 0 Flight, History of, 7 Encyclopedia Britannica 380, 387-88 (Macropedia 1983 ed.); 
Wright, Orville and Wilbur, 19 Encyclopedia Britannica, id. at 1032. 
1 1 Cecil R. Roseberry, Glenn Curtiss: Pioneer of Flight 62 (1972). 
12 Id. at 67-82 . 
1 3 Curtiss's patent was titled "hydroaeroplane" and described a flying boat with wing 
flaps. It was presumably the first patent to incorporate wing flaps and served as the basis of 
Curtiss's claim to industry royalties for all airplanes. See the text at notes 22-24 infra. 
1 4 The history of the Curtiss-Wright patent dispute appears in 2 The Papers of Wilbur and 
Orville Wright 907, 1087-88 n.10, 1092-98 n . l l (Marvin W. McFarland ed. 1953); Fred C. 
Kelly, The Wright Brothers 287-99 (1943); and Roseberry, supra note 11, at 115, 230, 332-
62. 
1 5 Roseberry, supra note 11, at 357. The Selden patent case has another connection with 
the aircraft agreement. Judge John R. Hazel of the District Court of Southern New York, 
who in 1900 had recognized George Selden as the inventor of the automobile, also upheld the 
Wrights' claim on the scope of their airplane patent in 1910 and again in 1913. On appeal by 
Henry Ford, Selden's patent was later held valid but not infringed, while Hazel's decision in 
the Wright-Curtiss litigation was upheld on appeal in 1915. 
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the government since some firms were reluctant to take contracts because 
of the threat of patent infringement suits. The Wright-Martin Company 
demanded, and in some cases got, $1,000 per airplane and was threatening 
to sue those considered to be infringers—effectively any airplane manu-
facturer. 1 6 
The original request for harmony came in January 1917 from the secre-
taries of war and the navy . 1 7 Following the U.S. declaration of war in 
April 1917, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics proposed a 
cross-licensing agreement. 1 8 The Wright-Martin Company resisted, claim-
ing that it was entitled to large royalties. It eventually yielded and joined 
the agreement on less ambitious terms when Congress passed legislation 
that would have condemned the patents. 1 9 Crisp was apparently the chief 
architect of the pool, and he suggested a patent cross-licensing agreement 
similar to the one that was in effect in the automobile industry. 2 0 The 
patent agreement applied to aircraft structures, excluding engines and 
instruments, and comprised 130 patents in 1917.2 1 
B. Terms of the Cross-licensing Agreement 
The agreement resolved the Wright-Curtiss dispute and made it impos-
sible for a similar dispute to arise among manufacturers who belonged to 
the association. Each member granted all its airplane patents to all other 
members. 2 2 Members paid a $1,000 initiation fee and $200 per airplane 
built, which was distributed as follows: $135 to the Wright-Martin Com-
1 6 Statement of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, in Pooling of Patents, Hearings before the 
Patents Committee, on H.R. 4523 74th Cong., pt. 1, at 3-4 (1936); and Manufacturers 
Aircraft Ass'n, Inc. v. The United States, 77 C. Cls., at 481, 484 (1933), hereinafter MAA. 
1 7 Howard Mingos, Birth of an Industry 13, 14 (1930), reprinted in The History of the 
American Aircraft Industry (Gene R. Simonson ed. 1968); and MAA 77 C. Cls., at 484. 
1 8 Mingos, supra note 17, at 17; and MAA 77 C. Cls., at 485. 
1 9 MAA 77 C. Cls., at 490-91. 
2 0 Mingos, supra note 17; and Roseberry, supra note 11, at 361. 
2 1 The agreement applied to 4 4heavier-than-air craft, using wing surfaces (and including) 
power plant appurtenances . . . but not to include the engine and engine accessories.' 1 
Subsequently, the agreement was amended as new developments occurred. Patents pertain-
ing to sound suppressors, fuel cells, ground effect vehicles, and new types of materials such 
as plastic were excluded, but exhaust flow deflectors and guided missiles with winged 
surfaces were included. The eight charter members of the association were: Aeromarine, 
Burgess, Curtiss, L.W.F. Engineering, Standard Aircraft, Sturtevant, Thomas-Morse, and 
Wright-Martin. The Dayton Wright Company was added a few months later. Roseberry, 
supra note 11, at 475 n.2. Mitchell, in Pooling of Patents, supra note 16, at 4, lists seven 
more firms as having been involved in discussion, but it is not clear if they were ever 
members. 
2 2 The 1917 agreement, supplements to it, and the 1928 agreement are reproduced in 
Pooling of Patents, supra note 16, app., pt. 3, at 3064-3111 (1936). 
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pany (the successor to the Wright brothers' firm) until it accumulated $2 
million or until the Wright patent 2 3 (issued in 1906) expired, whichever 
came first; $40 to the Curtiss Company until payments on the Wright 
patent ceased, after which Curtiss was to receive $175 until the total to 
Curtiss reached $2 million or until the Curtiss patent 2 4 (issued in 1916) 
expired; and $25 to the association. The $25 was to be kept past 1933, the 
expiration date of the patent. 
All other patents, current and future, were available royalty free to 
members, except for a special class of future patents to be described. In 
the event that the government ordered planes from a manufacturer that 
were based on another manufacturer's design, 1 percent of the purchase 
price, up to a total payment of $50,000 for one model, would go to the 
original designer. This provision was subsequently dropped. The $25 per 
plane remaining with the association was to go toward operating ex-
penses, the purchase of airplane patents and other activities contributing 
to the ' 'development of the airplane art and industry," any remainder to 
be returned to the members. Manufacturers belonging to the association 
could license their patents to nonmembers if the terms were no more 
favorable than to members. Any party to the agreement could withdraw, 
but its patents in the pool at the time of withdrawal would remain there. 
It seems worth observing at this point that the total royalty per airplane 
fell a good deal short of what Wright-Martin had been demanding. The 
timing of the agreement and its relatively modest royalty terms for the 
Wright and perhaps the Curtiss patent can probably be attributed to 
the threat of government action. 2 5 
An important aspect of the agreement concerned the determination of 
royalties on "after acquired" patents. Such a patent would be eligible for 
royalties from members only if it "secures the performance of a function 
not before known to the art or constitutes an adaptation for the first time 
to a commercial use of an invention known to the industry to be desirable 
of use but not used because of lack of adaptation, or is otherwise of 
striking character or constitutes a radical departure from previous prac-
tice, or if either the price paid therefor or the amount expended in devel-
oping the same is such as to justify such compensation." The aim appears 
to have been to define patents more narrowly than was the practice of the 
2 3 U .S . Patent Office, Orville Wright and Wilbur Wright, Flying Machine, Patent No. 
821,393 (1906). 
2 4 U .S . Patent Office, Glenn H. Curtiss, Hydroaeroplane, Patent No. 1,203,550 (1916). 
2 5 It may also help to view the agreement against the background of the 4'association 
movement," which was then in full swing and which was a response to the antitrust policies 
of the Taft and Wilson administrations. See Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the 
National Recovery Administration (1976). 
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U.S. Patent Office. There was no appeal to the courts. A board of arbitra-
tion determined which patents were eligible and set patent royalties. It 
was composed of three arbiters, one of whom was appointed by the board 
of directors of the association, one by the member making a claim, and 
the third by the other two arbiters. Similar procedures were followed in 
the event of a dispute between members. 
The most important subsequent change I am aware of, the consent 
decree excepted, occurred with the expiration of the Curtiss patent in 
1933, when, in accordance with the 1928 agreement, payments supporting 
the association were reduced to one-fourth of 1 percent, to cover only 
operating expenses. 2 6 These payments were further reduced in 1935 to 
one-eighth of 1 percent. Of the 750 patents licensed under the agreement 
in 1935, 159 had been brought to arbitration in the years from 1929 to 
1935. Of these, 87 were refused compensation, and 51 received cash 
awards. (Decisions on the rest were apparently pending.) Total cumulated 
royalty payments to 1933 amounted to $4,360,000, of which the Curtiss 
and Wright companies got $2 million each. The remaining $360,000 went 
to other patent holders. 2 7 On government work, manufacturers had been 
allowed to use any patent without providing compensation, whether the 
manufacturer belonged to the association or not, and the patent holder's 
recourse was the court of claims. 2 8 On the other hand, a manufacturer 
obtained title to any patent that resulted from performing government 
work, but the government obtained a royalty-free license on the patent. 
The agreement survived in this form until 1972, when it was challenged 
by the Department of Justice. It was abandoned in the 1975 consent 
decree. 2 9 Ironically, the Manufacturers Aircraft Association's cross-
2 6 Vaughan, supra note 1, at 64. 
2 7 F. H. Russell, Second Supplemental Statement, in Pooling of Patents, supra note 22, 
app., pt. 3, at 2977. 
2 8 Vaughan, supra note 1, at 65. This has been true since 1917. The difficulty of recovery 
in the court of claims and the customary "save harmless" clause in government contracts, 
which shifted liability for any court of claims award back to the manufacturer who built an 
airplane for the government, were discussed in a number of investigations. See Russell, 
supra note 27, at 2972; and Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air Services, H.R. 
1653, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925). 
2 9 United States v. Manufacturers Aircraft Assn., Civil No. 72 Civ. 1307: MEL, Trade 
Reg. Rep. (CCH), para. 68, 503. Also see Proposed Consent Judgment and Competitive 
Impact Statement, 40 Fed. Reg. 30, 848 (1975). The defendants in the case were, in addition 
to the Manufacturers Aircraft Association, twenty firms: Aeronca, Beech, Bell Aerospace, 
Boeing, Cessna, Curtiss-Wright, Fairchild Hiller, General Dynamics, Goodyear Aerospace 
(later dropped as a defendant), Grumman, Kaman, LTV, Lockheed, Martin-Marietta, 
McDonnell Douglas, North American Rockwell, Northrop, Piper, Ryan, and United Air-
craft. 
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licensing agreement was one of the most thoroughly investigated patent 
agreements on record and had received numerous clean bills of health. 3 0 
I V . THE ANTICOMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OF THE AGREEMENT 
The government claimed in its 1972 suit against the members of the 
Manufacturers Aircraft Association that the cross-licensing agreement of 
1928 hampered competition in research and development and that the 
amount of research and development in the aircraft industry would have 
been greater without the agreement. Taking this claim perhaps more seri-
ously than was intended, one might imagine that the aircraft producers 
were accused of trying to freeze technical progress where it stood in 1917. 
Of course a zero royalty rate combined with an automatic right to use 
competitors' patents will, other things being equal, reduce the incentive 
to produce innovations, at least patentable ones. Other things are not the 
same, as I will show in Section V , but I first want to examine whether the 
agreement was well designed to slow progress and increase profits. 
3 0 Immediately following its organization, a newspaper outcry against the 44aircraft trust 1' 
ensued in August 1917. The furor over the aircraft trust led to an investigation by the 
attorney general, who cleared the arrangement in October 1917. The Bureau of Aircraft 
Production also asked three patent lawyers to survey the agreement, and they concluded 
that the Curtiss and Wright patents were valid and that the Curtiss and Wright companies 
were entitled to the royalties stipulated under the agreement. Indignation over the $200 per 
plane royalty persisted, however. At the suggestion of the secretary of the navy, who again 
raised the possibility of patent condemnation, the agreement was amended to reduce the 
royalties by half. The navy and war departments also pledged to pay the reduced royalty on 
any planes they built themselves or had built for them by firms not belonging to the associa-
tion. Charges concerning an 4 4air trust" continued to be made, however, and these charges 
led to the formation of a presidential commission chaired by Charles Evans Hughes, a 
former Supreme Court Justice. This commission again cleared the association and agree-
ment. The 4 4trust" issue was raised once more in 1920 when aircraft manufacturers sought 
government protection from the sale at low prices of European planes left over from the 
First World War. The agreement was also the subject of a more extensive investigation in 
the Lambert committee hearings of 1924, whose final report cleared the association yet 
again. At the same time, the association was the defendant in an antitrust suit filed by one of 
the chief accusers in the congressional hearings, James Martin. This suit was dismissed. The 
association was subjected to additional legal scrutiny in the suit it filed against the govern-
ment for the government's failure to pay royalties on airplanes it had built for itself or had 
had others build for it. The association won this case. It was cleared yet again in a presi-
dential report that explicitly held that cross-licensing was beneficial to the U.S. government. 
The report called the agreement 4 4 the very antithesis of monopoly." U.S. Federal Aviation 
Commission, Message from the President of the U.S . , 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. No. 15, at 
221 (January 30, 1935). Still another investigation of the aircraft patent pool was conducted 
in 1935, which again left the agreement intact. This summary stems from: MAA, 77 C. Cls., 
at 481 (1933); Mingos, supra note 17; and Additional Material Submitted to the Committee 
on Patents by F. H. Russell, in Pooling of Patents, supra note 22, app., at 2962-3001. 
Russell, at 2964, claims that the pool was investigated at least twenty times between 1917 
and 1935. 
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One difficulty with the idea that the aim of the agreement was to hamper 
progress is that firms were free to compete for customers in other ways. 
Its effect would have been similar to a price-fixing agreement that left 
much room for nonprice competition. In this case, however, firms could 
use price competition to compete away one nonprice restriction, and they 
could use nonprice competition in nonpatentable aspects of aircraft de-
sign and construction, as well as competition in patentable aspects not 
covered by the agreement (nonstructural aspects of aircraft design). So, 
for example, they could compete by offering new models based on exist-
ing jointly held patents. It also seems important to keep in mind that while 
aircraft manufacture has always been research intensive to begin with, 
research efforts can fruitfully be devoted to ends other than developing 
new patents. 
The notion that aircraft manufacturers would restrain themselves in 
nonpatentable spheres is hard to sustain. Although the industry is and has 
been concentrated, 3 1 a fact which seems to have figured strongly in the 
government's case, it has also been marked by intense competition. For 
example, while the four-firm concentration ratio has hovered above 50 
percent in recent times, there is considerable instability in market shares. 
Table 1 shows the market shares of a particular market served by the 
defendants: in-service aircraft for U.S. passenger airlines from 1932 to 
1965. This period covers 70 percent of the period years during which the 
agreement was in effect. Douglas's share went from zero in 1932 to 93.4 
in 1944 and declined to 26.8 in 1965. Boeing's share increased in the 
mid-thirties to 28.6, fell for two decades, and then increased again in the 
1960s. Similarly, Lockheed's fortunes declined and then revived. Convair 
and Martin(-Marietta) made good showings in the 1950s, but not before or 
since. It should be emphasized that these figures pertain to stocks of 
airplanes and understate substantially the year-to-year fluctuations in 
sales. The overall demand for long-lived capital goods like airplanes is 
volatile, even neglecting fluctuations due to swings in defense outlays. 
These sorts of fluctuations, especially in the case of a product as 
heterogeneous as airplanes, are widely believed to make the kind of collu-
sion that enriches producers unlikely. 
The obvious and radical changes in airplane size, speed, reliability, 
safety, and comfort that occurred over the years of the agreement also 
contribute to the impression that the degree of product variety and the 
3 1 The four largest firms in the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification "aircraft" 
control 58.5 percent of all shipments, the eight largest 81.2, and the twenty largest 98.6 
percent. U . S . Bureau of the Census, Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing, Census of 
Manufactures 9-116 (1977). 
T A B L E 1 
PASSENGER AIRLINE FLEET SHARES BY MANUFACTURER, 1 9 3 2 - 6 5 
Year Douglas Boeing Lockheed Convair Martin Others 
1 9 3 2 . 0 1 9 . 0 8 . 0 .8 .0 7 2 . 2 
1 9 3 5 1 7 . 7 2 8 . 6 18.1 1.9 . 0 3 3 . 7 
1 9 3 8 6 1 . 9 1 6 . 9 19 .5 .0 .0 1.7 
1941 8 1 . 9 9 . 6 8 .5 .0 .0 .0 
1 9 4 4 9 3 . 4 .4 5 . 9 .0 .0 . 0 
1 9 4 7 9 2 . 3 .7 5 . 8 . 0 1.2 .0 
1 9 5 0 6 8 . 7 1.9 12 .2 1 3 . 0 4 . 2 . 0 
1 9 5 3 5 0 . 8 1.7 1 5 . 6 2 0 . 1 1 1 . 8 .0 
1 9 5 6 4 6 . 5 .8 17 .4 2 0 . 5 9 . 8 5 . 2 
1 9 5 9 4 3 . 8 4 . 5 2 4 . 5 1 4 . 0 6 . 8 6 . 4 
1 9 6 2 3 9 . 4 1 5 . 6 2 1 . 8 14 .1 1.4 7 . 7 
1 9 6 5 2 6 . 8 3 6 . 2 1 7 . 6 1 1 . 7 .0 7 . 7 
SOURCE.—Almarin Phillips, Technology and Market Structure ( 1 9 7 1 ) , table 2-5, at 3 0 . 
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T A B L E 2 
OVERLAP BETWEEN AEROSPACE PATENTS AND PATENTS IN CROSS-LICENSING AGREEMENTS 
No. of New No. of New 
Year Aerospace Patents Patents in Agreement No. in Both 
1968 315 62 23 
1969 338 55 19 
1970 291 69 24 
1971 336 61 29 
1972 268 56 26 
Total 1,548 303 121 
SOURCE.—Manufacturers Aircraft Association, Documents on file at the Department of Justice, 
Licensed Airline Patents, Exhibit B; and U . S . Patent and Trademark Office of the U . S . Department of 
Commerce, Index of Patents (various years) (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C), 
passim. 
rate of progress in aircraft science made it difficult to collude by means of 
a patent pooling agreement of the sort discussed here; that is, the agree-
ment seems poorly designed to redistribute the gains of trade from con-
sumers to producers. 3 2 
The available patent data for the last decade and a half of the patent 
agreement likewise fail to support the idea that the purpose of the agree-
ment was to suppress innovation. The agreement did not dominate patent 
activity in any of the categories established by the patent office. A total 
of 303 new patents were added to the agreement over the years 1968-72. 
Of these, 121 were in patent category 244—aerospace—and these 121 
patents accounted for only 7.8 percent of all patents in this category (see 
Table 2). The remaining patents covered by the agreement were spread 
over various other patent categories, such as fluid dynamics. 
Even in particular subclasses of aerospace patents, those patents as-
signed to the association only rarely accounted for more than 20 percent 
of the total, as Table 3 shows. In those categories with the highest fraction 
3 2 Some of these trends are documented in Almarin Phillips, Technology and Market 
Structure: A Study of the Aircraft Industry (1971). For example, operating costs for piston-
powered aircraft decreased from over 4 cents to about 2 cents per seat-mile (in current 
dollars) from the 1930s to the 1960s. Costs per seat-mile for jet aircraft had decreased to less 
than 1.5 cents by the mid-1960s. Capacity for the largest airliner in service in the 1930s was 
30 passengers (the Metal Aircraft Corporation's 4 4Flamingo"); by the 1960s, the typical 
airliner used by domestic trunk lines carried over 100 passengers. Cruising speed increased 
from less than 200 to over 500 miles per hour between the 1930s and the 1960s. John 
Newhouse , The Sporty Game (1982), provides accounts of the competition among aircraft 
manufacturers. This competition appears to take place on the basis of operating efficiency, 
engineering integrity, configuration, and price. 
T A B L E 3 
N E W AEROSPACE AND PATENT POOL PATENTS, 1968-72, BY SELECTED SUBCLASSES IN THE AEROSPACE CATEGORY 
Subclass Abbreviated Description Pool All Aerospace 
1 Not elsewhere classified 1 178 
2 Compound aeronautical machines 1 18 
3 Compound aeronautical machines 1 4 
3.1-3.7 Unmanned missiles 0 126 
4, 5, 6 Various aeronautical machines 1 19 
7 Helicopters 9 26 
12 Aeronautical machines sustained with airfoils and jets of air or other fluid 2 41 
13 Machine sustained by aerodynamic action on airfoil 3 20 
17.11-17.23 Gyroplanes, helicopters 14 71 
23 Machines sustained with jets of air or other fluid 2 32 
30-39 Lighter-than-air machines 0 56 
40-45 Airfoils, lift devices 15 78 
46 Provisions for altering arrangement of airfoils 7 25 
47-49 Sustaining airfoils 3 14 
50-59 Propelling devices, power plants, and power-plant accessories* 12 94 
62-64 Propellers, launching devices, human-powered craft 0 25 
73-79 Control devices, jets 4 108 
80-89 Control systems, airfoils, rudders 9 31 
Total 84 966 
All other subclasses 37 582 
Grand total 121 1,548 
S O U R C E S . — U . S . Patent and Trademark Office, Classification Definitions, Class 244—Aeronautics (February 1975), passim; Manufacturers Aircraft Association, 
documents on file at the Department of Justice, Licensed Airline Patents, Exhibit B; and U . S . Patent and Trademark Office of the U . S . Department of Commerce, 
Index of Patents (various years) ( U . S . Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.), passim. 
* Includes power plants or accessories incorporated as part of structure and power-plant mounts. 
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of patents in the pool (categories 7, 46, and 80-89), investigation revealed 
that all the other patents (save one) belonged to nonmembers. These were 
in large part foreign corporations but also included the federal govern-
ment and independent inventors. 
It is of course possible that the patents in the agreement were the only 
valuable ones within certain areas. The point here is merely that the 
agreement did not monopolize innovation in even the most narrowly 
defined subclasses recognized by the patent office. There were also many 
subclasses in which not a single patent fell under the agreement. 3 3 Conse-
quently, if the agreement did hamper progress in some areas, others were 
left untouched. These results tend to confirm the impression that emerges 
from the description of the terms of the agreement, namely, that only a 
restricted set of airplane patents was covered. 
This examination of the scope of the agreement and of competitive 
conditions in the aircraft industry, as well as some straightforward e c o -
nomic agreements, suggest that, if the agreement succeeded in curtailing 
research and development expenditures, it did so in a limited area o f 
technology, and it did not protect firms from the rigors of competition. 
V . COOPERATIVE MODIFICATION OF PATENT RIGHTS 
Assuming that the monopoly explanation is unsatisfactory, the aircraft 
patent agreement poses three puzzles: 
1. Why would a group of manufacturers, some of whom own patents 
and some of whom may not, agree to share their current and future 
patents on a royalty-free basis? 
2. Why would such a group provide an arbitration mechanism t h a t 
selects some patents to receive aribitrated royalties? 
3. Why would the agreement be restricted to patents on aircraft s t ruc-
tures and explicitly exclude engines, instruments, and other aircraft com-
ponents? 
I take these questions up from a static viewpoint first. 
A. Patents That Fall from Heaven 
The simple answer to the question of when a group of firms will s h a r e 
their patents freely instead of charging for them is axiomatic but instruc-
3 3 During the years 1960-72, the following subclasses are among those that had ten o r 
more new patents of which not even one fell under the agreement: landing gear with w h e e l s 
(subclass 103), devices for slowing, holding, or restraining aircraft (subclass 110), aircraft 
seats (subclass 122), and fuel storage and fueling arrangements (subclass 135). Many o t h e r 
subclasses had only one or two patents that were included in the agreement. 
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tive. A group of firms will share patents without royalties when each 
expects to gain more from unrestricted use of other firms' patents than it 
loses by not being able to charge for its own. This way of stating the issue 
shows its relationship to another problem: when will members of a group 
share their secrets? It is also related to the reason university professors do 
not charge for conversations in the hallway or for the subsequent use of 
their ideas, whether these are published or not. In this subsection, I will 
assume that patents are a costless by-product of the firm's activity, that 
they in effect fall from heaven. 
1. Perfectly Efficient Contracts Possible. Imagine a matrix of benefits, 
in which the element by is the benefit to the /th firm of using the7th firm's 
patents. The simplest assumption is that these benefits are additive. The 
sum of a column, represents the total value to all firms in the indus-
try of a given firm's patents, and the sum of a row, 2/&#, represents the 
total value to a given firm of having all patents in the industry available to 
it royalty free. For a group of firms producing complex, closely related 
products, a large fraction of the columns will contain positive elements. 
Let Abu be the change in the value of a firm's own patents to itself—the 
change in value of its own discoveries that results when others are al-
lowed to use them at no cost. 
A familiar starting point assumes no transactions costs. Can a set of 
side payments be found that allows each firm to use each patent on which 
it places a positive value? There are several candidates. Perfect price 
discrimination would allow efficient use of the patents, as would a price of 
zero for each patent. The only difference between these two solutions is 
the allocation of gains, which suggests one difficulty that might crop up in 
an actual example. The following points seem pertinent. 
a) In contrast to some other economic problems, the allocation of the 
gains from trade is not narrowed or made easier by having more firms 
involved. This is an implication of the assumption that each patent is 
unique. Take the simple case in which benefits are additive, all by = 1, 
and Aba = 0. For three firms, the return to any one firm from participating 
in an industrywide royalty-free agreement is indeterminate over the range 
from 2 to 5. The best a firm can do is capture 5 out of a total of 9 for itself, 
leaving 4 to be split between the other two. The other two firms can 
always guarantee themselves this total of 4 by splitting off by themselves. 
By similar arguments, the worst a firm can do is get a gain of only 2. An 
analogous calculation for n = 4 yields a range from 3 to 7. Although this 
range per firm expressed as a fraction of the total benefits available is l/n 
for arbitrary n, it is always equal to the gains that can potentially be 
provided by one firm to the rest of the industry. 
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b) There may of course be interactions among patents, and these in-
teractions are not captured by the assumption of additive patent benefits. 
Suppose instead that the benefits are multiplicative, so that the benefit to 
a firm of having a given patent depends on it having all the other patents. 
(For simplicity, assume that by > 1 for all i and j.) Now the potential range 
of gain for each firm is between zero and the total available to all firms 
from all the patents. Although multiplicative benefits is an extreme illus-
tration of complementarity of patents—and this could be either com-
plementarity across the technical functions of different patents or the 
complementarity of earlier and later discoveries 3 4—the economic prob-
lem it addresses seems potentially important. From this viewpoint, the 
rationale for a "private condemnation" of patents that apply to a product 
is like the rationale for eminent domain. It eliminates difficulties posed by 
the holdout problem. 
c) Another feature of independent contracts between the firms in an 
industry is that the number of contracts is potentially very large. With n 
firms, there are (n - l)n/2 bilateral relationships and, assuming only one 
patent per firm, potentially (n - \)n royalty schedules that have to be 
negotiated and monitored. One justification for limited patent life is that 
the number of contracts that would have to be formulated and monitored 
would be very great with unlimited patent grants. But the optimal patent 
life surely varies from industry to industry—being shorter in industries 
with rapid technological advance and in industries with products that 
embody a large number of patents held by different producers. These 
factors would tend to tip the balance against pairwise agreements and 
toward an industrywide agreement. 
This simple static conception of the private costs and benefits of a 
patent agreement is consistent with other rationales for such agreements. 
One striking feature of patent rights is that the degree to which those 
rights can be defined is a good deal lower than in the case of, say, land, 
poetry, or even a trademark. This implies that resources can be used to 
influence the distribution of net gains. This may be traced in part to a 
failing of the legal system. In principle, the expenses used to define rights 
3 4 This second possibility suggested itself after I read Ben T. Yu, Potential Competition 
and Contracting in Innovation, 24 J. Law & Econ. 215 (1981). Yu focuses on the competition 
for innovative ideas and the problem of capturing—and, I would add, allocating—returns 
from sequential innovations. In arguments that I believe to be related to the analysis here, 
Yu suggests two reasons why private remedies, including royalty-free exchange of rights 
within an industry, might be desirable: the cost of knowing when future developments can 
be anticipated varies across industries (this implies it may be difficult to arrange contracts 
between earlier and later inventors) and enforcement costs in privately enforced contracts 
may be less. Id. at 231. 
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are justifiable if they help channel rewards to inventors whose inventions 
are sufficiently valuable and would not otherwise become known. How-
ever, the lack of clarity in some areas may have carried the struggle for 
favorable definition past the optimum. 3 5 
2. Perfectly Efficient Contracts Not Possible. A firm setting prices in 
its own interests will not set a price of zero and in general will also not be 
able to practice perfect price discrimination. This implies that it will be 
able to capture only a fraction of the total gains its patents embody. This 
is likely to be true even if it charges each user a specially tailored lump 
sum, or a lump sum plus a per-unit charge. In terms of payoffs that are 
additive, a firm will only capture a fraction of the sum of each column, 
Xj * i bjt. Conversely, it will only receive a fraction of the consumer 
surplus potentially available to it from other patents, * / by. Let a be the 
share of total benefits generated by a firm's patents that the firm collects, 
and p the share of benefits on other patents it collects as consumer sur-
plus. For a three-firm example, firm 1 will prefer a royalty-free patent 
agreement if 
*(b2l + b3l) + Abn < (1 - p) {bX2 + bl3). (1) 
Similar expressions hold for the other two firms. Suppose that the benefits 
are such that a = p = Vs, implying that VA of the total benefits are lost 
because of pricing imperfections. Also assume Abu = 0. A firm will prefer 
royalty-free licensing if the gains from other patents under free use 
amount to only 60 percent of the royalty gains potentially available to its 
patent under perfect price discrimination. To illustrate, the firms in this 
example will prefer royalty-free cross-licensing if all by = 1. For the case 
of n firms, for i = 1, . . . , n, the general condition analogous to (1) is 
a X h + Abu < (1 - P) X V (2) 
J * i J * i 
3 5 Timothy F. Bresnahan, Post-entry Competition in the Plain Paper Copier Market, 75 
Am. Econ. Rev. 15, 16 (1985), reports that IBM spent millions of dollars to invent around 
Xerox's major copier patents and that 25 percent of its budget for the project went to patent 
counsel. Michael Waldholz, Wall St. J., May 17, 1985, at 16, col. 3, claims that "the 
difficulty of getting uncontested biotech patents has led some large drug companies to avoid 
certain genetic-engineering research" and reports that two makers of interferon entered into 
a cross-licensing agreement, apparently to avoid a costly legal battle. One problem the 
courts seem to have had with aircraft and auto patent rights was in deciding whether a 
specific patent that incorporates a fundamental general principle should be defined to in-
clude all later versions of the product based on that principle. Some judges, like Hazel (see 
note 15 supra), were inclined to say yes—Selden held the auto patent and the Wrights held 
the airplane patent—but the courts did not speak with one voice. Ford's ultimate victory in 
the Selden case illustrates this. 
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This analysis of the gains from royalty-free sharing when the use of 
(positive) prices prevents all of the gains from trade that are ideally avail-
able from being realized can be framed in more familiar language. In this 
static context, a patent right is a public good. There are jointly realizable 
gains to the firms in an industry from allowing a particular patent to be 
used in all applications in which its marginal net contribution is greater 
than zero. A pricing system will generally prevent that, unless prices are 
zero. While a zero royalty agreement meets the aim of efficiency, it will 
not take place unless it also meets the aim of individual rationality, which 
means that inequality (2) must be satisfied for each firm.36 
Naturally, a firm for which inequality (2) does not hold because the 
royalties it can command are large can be induced to join with a side 
payment. This probably explains the payments to the Wright and Curtiss 
patents. However, if members of the agreement can advance this argu-
ment with future patents, they raise the old troublesome issues inherent in 
the use of positive prices to begin with since each firm would have an 
incentive to demand a side payment. This illuminates why future patents 
were included in the agreement. With each new patent a firm would have 
an incentive to hold its patent out of the agreement and try to find some 
pricing scheme that would allow it to capture a large share of the total 
benefits while still getting the other payments for free. Over the course of 
time the agreement would unravel. 
3. The Exclusion of Patents. Two exclusions from royalty-free shar-
ing existed in the agreement: patents of "striking character" received 
arbitrated royalties, and patents not pertaining to aircraft structures were 
excluded altogether. One reason for allowing patents of "striking charac-
ter" to receive royalties arises because firms may believe that the ex-
pected value of their current or future patents is so great that they would 
regret being in the agreement or that they would want to leave it. They 
can be induced to stay by means of a mechanism that awards them a 
payment in that event. In this static context the socially optimal point 
would be complete elimination of patent rights for all patents, but the 
3 6 The inefficiency of charging royalties for what is a public good is discussed in Baxter, 
supra note 6, at 274. The possibility that a royalty-free cross-licensing agreement might be a 
solution to this inefficiency is not mentioned, however. The notional inefficiency in alloca-
tion is also discussed in Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Re-
sources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social 
Factors at 616-19 (National Bureau of Economic Research 1962). But see Harold Demsetz, 
Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1969), for a critique of 
Arrow's policy conclusion that, because of this public good aspect, inter alia, inventive 
activity should be subsidized by the government. 
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private interests of the lucky individual firms with very valuable patents 
will thwart complete dismantlement of patent rights among members. 
Hence the rights will only be partly trimmed back. 
Note, however, that lax patent standards—standards that allow patent 
grants to ideas that merely fall from heaven—do not explain the arbi-
trated royalties on patents of " striking character" since the arbitration 
could have simply been on the question of whether or not to allow a firm 
to charge as it saw fit for a particular patent. Arbitrated royalties can be 
better handled, I believe, by (a) appealing to the difficulties posed by the 
holdout problem, especially when several separately held patents jointly 
produce a valuable innovation (see the first subsection here); (b) compar-
ing the costs of MAA arbitration proceedings with the patent negotiation 
and litigation costs that would otherwise take place; or (c) introducing the 
dynamic issues discussed in the next subsection. 
The exclusion of all but aircraft-structure patents from the agreement is 
consistent with the view that the agreement was aimed at eliminating the 
holdout problems that arise when the different patents crucial to an inno-
vation are held by different firms. Products such as engines, brakes, and 
instruments are likely to rely on one patent or a cluster of patents devel-
oped by the same inventor. They are often developed and produced by 
suppliers who are not themselves aircraft producers, or they are often 
produced by one firm in the industry and sold to the others. These condi-
tions imply that there is less possibility of several patents held by different 
firms in the industry resulting in a holdout problem. 3 7 
B. Patents That Are Costly to Develop 
The development and exploitation of patents that are not a costless by-
product of the firm's general business raises two new issues: inefficiency 
in patent competitions and the monopoly of the successful patent holder. 
The nature of these two problems can be illuminated with the example of 
costless contracting. In a world of costless contracting, potential users of 
a patent would write contracts with potential inventors that specified 
payment for actual expenditures necessary to develop a patent. These 
contracts would keep the cost of an innovation equal to the minimum 
3 7 The automobile patent agreement that emerged after the Selden patent dispute (see 
note 15 supra) also included exceptions for inventions embodying a major technical change 
(during the first ten years only one such claim was made, which was rejected) and for patents 
applying to parts manufacturers and to specialized vehicles such as motorcycles and fire 
engines. See John B. Rae, The American Automobile: A Brief History, 38-39 (1965). 
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necessary resource cost . 3 8 They would also keep the price of the innova-
tion to the purchaser equal to cost . 3 9 
The contracts that firms write with their engineers and scientists that 
grant patent rights to the firms are a simple real-world example of how 
contracts are used to keep the price of innovations equal to the cost. In 
many cases, however, neither the exact nature of the invention nor the 
identity of the inventor is known in advance. And even if the nature of a 
particular desired technical result is known, claim cannot be laid to it until 
it is presented in a working form to the patent office. In the meantime, 
resources can be wasted in a patent competition.4 0 
These two points concerning inefficiency in patent competition and the 
monopoly power of the successful monopolist can be illuminated by 
drawing a parallel to the function of the court system. The courts can be 
viewed as supplying the contract terms that are too complicated to specify 
ex ante for all contingencies. If contracting were costless and if future 
events were predictable, there would be no role for the courts except 
contract enforcement. Similarly, the Manufacturers Aircraft Agreement 
can be thought of as providing contract terms for future inventions. These 
terms called for zero royalties on more than 90 percent of all patents and 
low royalties on the rest. These low patent royalties may have regulated 
the flow of resources into patentable activity—which would provide a 
benign version of the government's contention that the idea was to limit 
competition—and they may simultaneously have mimicked the terms that 
3 8 It seems unlikely that broad definitions—a patent on the automobile or on the air-
plane—could be defended on economic grounds. Although the Wright brothers threw their 
energies into airplane invention in the hope of becoming wealthy—they not only pursued 
their patent infringement case vigorously but also worked secretively—others, imagining 
much smaller rewards looming ahead of them, were right behind. The development of a 
successful flying machine was only a matter of time, and it is unlikely that the introduction of 
the airplane a few years sooner would have been worth a monopoly grant on the airplane and 
the consumption of the extra resources that would have been involved in the competition to 
get it. It is noteworthy that a well-known aviation pioneer, Octave Chanute, who was a 
mentor to the Wrights, was cool to their dreams of an airplane monopoly and wrote to them 
that "the value of an invention is whatever it costs to reproduce it." Quoted in Roseberry, 
supra note 11, at 64. 
3 9 Yu, supra note 34, examines the problem of contracting for unspecified future innova-
tions, paying particular attention to the problem of sequential innovations. 
4 0 Barzel, supra note 6, first pointed to the possibility of a lack of property rights causing 
too much innovation. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J. Law & Econ. 265 (1977), suggests that the patent system may serve to prevent this waste 
from unallocated rights by allowing inventors to stake "prospects." For a contrary view, 
see Donald G. McFetridge and Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Sur-
plus: A Comment, 23 J. Law & Econ. 197 (1980); and for a defense see Edmund W. Kitch, 
Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Reply, 23 J. Law & Econ. 205 (1980). 
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would have emerged if inventors could bid at low cost for the right to 
produce future inventions. 
A similar argument underlies the government's treatment of patents for 
military planes. The government condemns patents that it needs for its 
war planes and allows the manufacturers from which it buys airplanes to 
use patents that belong to third parties. The patent holders are reimbursed 
through negotiations or, if those fail, through proceedings in the court of 
claims. This mechanism can be viewed as a way of preventing a patent 
holder from capturing the difference between the production cost of a 
plane and the amount the country is willing to pay for it in time of war. 
This is economically justified in the sense that, if potential inventors had 
contracted in advance with the government, they would have been given 
much less favorable terms than they can extract in wartime. 
The public policy question concerning royalty-free or low-royalty rights 
to patents that are costly to develop is whether the net gains from innova-
tion with patents—left over when gross gains are partially consumed in 
patent competition, imperfect pricing schemes, and a system of property 
rights run by the patent office and the courts—are greater than the gross 
gains from a system in which there are smaller rewards to patents but in 
which those wastes are largely avoided. How much smaller those gross 
gains will be depends on the degree to which reductions in royalty pay-
ments stifle the development of useful patents. And naturally, it will also 
depend on the arbitration mechanism used for determining royalties. It 
does not seem wise to try to provide a decisive answer, but the following 
points seem worth noting. The total monetary value of innovation, the 
gross benefits, may be less, but the development costs of patents, the 
social losses inherent in less-than-perfect prices and in legal costs will 
almost certainly be less, as will the profits going to successful patent 
holders. The gains to producers will be greater, otherwise the agreement 
would not have been entered into. As a matter of arithmetic, the gains to 
consumers will only decrease if the total amount of innovation is greatly 
reduced or if low-royalty licensing increases the gains to producers by a 
sufficiently large amount . 4 1 
4 1 Vaughan's classic treatise on patents argues that the aircraft agreement, although 
avoiding patent conflicts, also stifled innovation. However, the two examples he cites do not 
support his arguments. Vaughan, supra note 1, at 67. The jet engine, which allegedly came 
from an independent inventor, fell outside the agreement and was simultaneously being 
developed abroad anyway. His second example, that the industry failed to contribute to 
advances in war planes, is, even if true, beside the point since the government directs and 
finances a good deal of defense research. On the other hand, Glenn Curtiss seemed to think 
during the period of the early patent disputes that staking out and defending airplane patents 
may not have been worth the effort. Upon hearing that the Wright brothers had begun to 
build flying boats, for which he had a patent application pending, Curtiss wrote: "It is not 
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V I . CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The aircraft manufacturers' agreement offers challenges to economic 
theory and to our understanding of the patent system in large part because 
the agreement seems so poorly designed to further monopoly gain. From 
the traditional view of patent and antitrust law, the government's case is 
paradoxical. Patent grants are thought to be "monopolies" and, as such, 
in uneasy coexistence with antitrust. Yet an agreement whose primary 
effect was the suspension of patent rights within a certain sphere and the 
reduction of royalties to less than they would otherwise have been was 
prosecuted as an antitrust violation. 
Economic arguments and the available data give no encouragement to 
the idea that the aim was to suppress innovation and provide consumers 
with an inferior product. There are clear, unambiguous welfare advan-
tages to pooling existing patents at zero or low royalty rates. Pooling 
future patents has the same effects so long as a provision is made for 
arbitrated royalties that cover the cost of patentable discoveries that 
would not otherwise be made. The arbitration procedure, used occasion-
ally in the early years for which we have evidence, can be interpreted as 
an attempt to promote that sort of discovery. Evidence on the instability 
of market shares, the rate of technical advance, and nonprice competition 
also makes it seem unlikely that the agreement restricted progress and 
hurt consumers. 
On the arguments advanced here, it makes sense to suppress patent 
rights if they generate more problems than they solve. A patent system 
allows inventors to recover more of their costs; it makes it easier for a 
single, well-defined idea to pass the market test; and it creates a transfer-
able right. The problems emerge partly because of the special nature of 
invention. Clear boundaries cannot be established—especially in ad-
vance—and this invites wasteful competition over the rights to an innova-
tion, both in the courtroom and the laboratory. Because innovative ideas 
are a special instance of public goods, the benefits of property rights and 
the use of the price system are obtained at the expense of efficiency in 
allocation. Another problem is general to a larger class of economic prod-
ucts: how can buyers keep prices paid for goods close to the opportunity 
costs of providing them? This is likely to be especially troublesome when 
potential buyers and sellers do not know each other and the nature of the 
product is difficult to specify in advance. 
our desire to monopolize the business, but on such things as we originate we feel we should 
at least get a royalty so that, if possible, we may be reimbursed for the money we have spent 
on patents. / am beginning to think, however, that the best plan is to let the patents go, and 
go after the business." Quoted in Roseberry, supra note 11, at 328 (emphasis added). 
